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STANDING: A LEGAL PROCESS APPROACH
by
Wallace M. Rudooh * and Janet L. Rudolph**
ANY articles have been written about standing and most have
complained that the standing cases cannot be understood on a
rational basis.' The purpose of this Article is to explain the na-
ture of the doctrine of standing within the legal process and to propose
how standing can be fairly and consistently applied.
In order to understand the concept of standing, its purpose must be dis-
covered. The purpose of standing lies in the nature of the legal process
and the function of our judiciary. In Marbury v. Madison2 Justice Mar-
shall discussed the judicial function in terms of the Court's authority to
declare unconstitutional a statute enacted by Congress. Marshall's discus-
sion serves as a fair description of the nature of judicial power in general,
since any court's power to act arises from its constitutional grant of author-
ity to decide cases and controversies between parties.3 Because courts are
designed to settle specific disputes, they are not competent to deal with
generalized grievances against society. Neither can courts give advisory
opinions. Hence, the classic example: Even though Secretary of State Jef-
ferson asked the United States Supreme Court to answer certain legal
questions concerning the British blockade of French ports, Chief Justice
Jay respectfully declined, since to do so was beyond the reach of judicial
power.4
The constitutional and judicial rejection of authority to deal with gener-
alized grievances, as well as the rejection of authority to grant advisory
opinions, arises from judicial recognition that a court's essential function is
dispute settlement in accordance with legal principles, not law declaration.
In the dispute-settlement process, legal principles are applied to a known,
*B.A., J.D., University of Chicago. Former Dean, University of Puget Sound School
of Law. Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law.
** B.A., M.A., University of Nebraska; J.D., University of Wisconsin.
1. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action.: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and
Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390 (1980); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing.' A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2: "The judicial Power shall extend to all cases [and] contro-
versies ......
4. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-
65 (2d ed. 1973). The questions referred to in this book were taken from 3 H. JOHNSON,
CORRESPONDENCE & PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, 1763-1781, at 486-89 (1891), and the
questions from 10 J. SPARKS, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 542-45 (1836).
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fixed set of facts, and the decision is thus limited to the application of that
principle to that set of facts. Under this system, the parties come to the
court with a specific claim of right (either statutory or customary) 5 and
argue that, under the peculiar facts of the case, their claim of right should
be upheld. The court then chooses one of the claims of right and explains
how under the facts of the particular case the appropriate claim of right
was chosen. Without particular facts and without particular claims of
right before the court, a decision of the court is not compelled by the judi-
cial decisionmaking process. 6 An existing conflict is required because each
individual's liberties or claims of right are defined in terms of every other
individual's liberties or claims of right.7 Consequently, if persons other
5. Customary rights are rights based on common law rules of decision rather than
specific statutory rights.
6. H. HART & A. SACKS, LEGAL PROCESs 422-23 (tentative ed. 1958), in which they
quote from "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (an unpublished paper presented by
Prof. Lon L. Fuller to a group of Harvard University faculty members on Nov. 19, 1957).
Prof. Fuller stated as follows:
I have said previously that adjudication is most effective in determining the
issues presented by (1) a claim of right made by one party upon another, and
(2) questions of responsibility, including under that term the accentuated re-
sponsibility we call fault or guilt.
It is clear, I believe, that any claim of right necessarily implies a principle or
rule. If I say, "Give me that, I want it," I do not by implication. assert any
principle which justifies my demand; I am merely expressing a desire and per-
haps a threat to use whatever means are available to me to effectuate that
desire.
On the other hand, if I say, "Give that to me, I claim it as a right," or, "I claim
it because it is due me, or because it is mine," then by necessary implication I
imply some rule or principle by which my claim may be judged.
It is important to note that the rule or principle implied in a claim of right
need not have antedated the claim itself. If one boy says to another, "Give me
that catcher's mitt," and answers the question, "Why?" by saying, "Because I
am the best catcher on the team," he asserts a principle by which the equip-
ment of the team ought to be apportioned in accordance with ability to use it.
He necessarily implies that, were the respective abilities of the two boys re-
versed, the mitt should remain where it is. But he does not, by necessary im-
plication, assert that the principle by which he supports his claim is an
established one. Indeed, up to the time this claim was made, the right to be
catcher might depend, not on ability, but on ownership of the catcher's mitt.
In that event the claim based upon the new principle of ability might, in effect,
propose a revolution in the organization of the team. At the same time, this
claim does not necessarily imply a principle which can give meaning to the
demand that like cases be given like treatment.
Similarly any determination of human responsibility necessarily implies some
standard that has not been met, but this standard may receive its first articula-
tion in the decision applying it.
We have now asserted two general propositions: First, adjudication is most
effective in deciding the validity of asserted claims, and in deciding questions
of human fault or responsibility. Second, a decision of either of these ques-
tions necessarily implies some standard or principle, though not necessarily
one that was established or articulated before the case came to judgment.
7. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). The famous exposition of the interrelationship appeared as a chart:
The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, suigeneris; and thus it is
that attempts at formal definition are always unsatisfactory, if not altogether
useless. Accordingly, the most promising line of procedure seems to consist in
exhibiting all of the various relations in a scheme of "opposites" and "correla-
[Vol. 36
STANDING
than those making a claim of right were allowed to raise issues, a court
could in effect issue general reviews of governmental action, give advisory
opinions on governmental action, or change the substantive claim of right
of a person affected by governmental action. The appropriate analysis
would recognize that standing decisions can be made only within a frame-
work of legal rights and duties. This analysis, however, assumes that rights
and duties may exist between the state and the public at large as well as
between private parties. Thus such rights and duties are functions of pub-
lic as well as private law.
The law of standing is presently in a confused state8 because the
Supreme Court has never fully understood that the concept of standing
must relate to the nature of the individual rights claimed. The common
law, state and federal statutes, and the Constitution protect and define
many rights. Some of these rights are property rights, while others include
the right of association, the right to petition, and the right to have input
into the decisionmaking process. Property rights may be divided into
rights held individually and those held in common. Decisions concerning
property rights depend upon basic legal concepts concerning the duties of
public officials as they extend to particular segments of the public. Confu-
sion exists in this area because standards of injury in fact were inappropri-
ately applied to cases involving political rights or common property rights.
For example, a series of cases in which federalism was the key issue were
instituted by plaintiffs who did not have standing to raise that issue. 9 In
each of these cases, the question was not whether the federal act or regula-
tion violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff, usually his fifth amend-
ment right not to have his property taken without due process of the law,' 0
but whether the federal act violated the state's rights under the tenth
tives," and then proceeding to exemplify their individual scope and applica-
tion in concrete cases. An effort will be made to pursue this method:
Jural rights privilege power immunity
Opposites no-rights duty disability liability
Jural right privilege power immunity
Correlatives duty no-right liability disability
Nothing in the analysis prevents the public, either as a class or a collective, from being the
entity that has immunity from regulation or coercion while the state has the disability. This
analysis should apply in first amendment cases.
8. Scholars seem equally confused when they argue in terms of liberal or conservative
policy rather than in terms of the legal process. For example, see the debate between
Brilmayer and Tushnet. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III. Perspectives on the
"Case or Controversy"Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979-1980); Tushnet, The Sociol-
ogy of Article III; A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1979-1980);
Brilmayer, 4 Reply, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1727 (1979-1980).
9. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Clearly, child labor was subject to
police regulation. The only issue was whether the federal government had authority to exer-
cise the police power within a state. The private parties were granted standing to argue the
state's interest. See also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), in which the
Court held that federal authority was limited because the authority to regulate belongs to the
state. In fact, the private party in E.C. Knight was granted authority to raise the state's
interest since monopolies were clearly subject to legitimate regulation.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."
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amendment."I That is, the Court ignored the federalism issue and focused
instead upon the right of any citizen to have his government act within its
grant of power.
The inappropriateness of allowing standing to individuals in such cases
is evident from the Supreme Court decisions of Massachusetts v. Mellon
and Frothingham v. Mellon.12 In Massachusetts v. Mellon the Court held
that the State of Massachusetts had standing to raise the issue of states'
rights, but that an individual citizen, Mrs. Frothingham, did not. Further,
the Court held that even though Massachusetts had standing, the case was
not appropriately before the Court because it involved a political ques-
tion. 13 The Court characterized the issue as a political question because
the particular tax act in question did not involve a direct conflict between
the exercise of state and federal power, thus requiring a judicial decision,
but involved instead a possible infringement upon the state's preroga-
tives. 4 In effect, the Court held that unless a direct conflict of authority
existed between the state and federal governments, the state could not raise
the issue of whether Congress had exceeded its powers. 15 Strangely
enough, in earlier decisions the Court had held that the owner of property
affected by federal law could judicially raise the issue of whether the fed-
eral government had invaded the province of the state.16
By contrast, in Frothingham v. Mellon the Court clearly stated that the
plaintiff, an individual, had no standing to raise the issue of states' rights in
a similar context since that privilege belonged solely to the state.17 As to
the states' rights issue, the plaintiff was, of course, in no better or no worse
position than owners of property who claim that a federal law is unconsti-
tutional because it implicates the state's power. Only when one examines
the second issue, whether the plaintiffs interest was sufficient, is any con-
trast with owners of property evident. Since the Court had already de-
cided that the plaintiff in Frothingham v. Mellon did not have standing to
11. Id. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
12. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (both cases decided in same opinion). In the consolidated cases,
the State of Massachusetts and an individual taxpayer attacked the constitutionality of a
federal statute, which provided federal monies to each state that complied with its provisions
to reduce maternal and infant mortality.
13. Standing was implicitly granted to Massachusetts because a political question arises
only after standing is recognized.
14. 262 U.S. at 483.
15. Id at 482-83.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), and the child labor cases. A
tenth amendment claim was appropriately raised in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976).
17. The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is
invalid, but that he has sustained some direct injury as the result of the enforcement. The
only claim of invalidity made by either Massachusetts or Mrs. Frothingham is that
"[rIeduced to its simplest terms, it is alleged that the statute constitutes an attempt to legis-
late outside the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution, and within the field of local
powers exclusively reserved to the states." 262 U.S. at 482. Thus Mrs. Frothingham's com-
plaint was not that the activity was illegal as to her personal interest either as a taxpayer or a
property holder, but that it infringed on the political rights of Massachusetts.
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raise the federalism issue, the taxpayer issue was a dictum. Why, then, did
the Court feel compelled to discuss taxpayer standing? The Court was
well aware that in a series of previous cases standing had been granted to
property owners to raise federalism issues even though these plaintiffs were
not asserting their own constitutional rights, but rather the right of the
states (or of the public) to keep the federal government within its constitu-
tional limits.' 8 In these cases the Court had decided that the property
owners, rather than the taxpayers or the states themselves, were the appro-
priate parties to bring the issue of federalism before the Court.
The only explanation for this apparent contradiction is that in the era of
substantive due process, when the judiciary was resisting the extension of
governmental power to control private property, the Court felt a need to
fashion any tool that could prevent such regulation.' 9 But to grant stand-
ing to property owners as private attorneys general so that they might rep-
resent the states' interests when the Court had previously held that the
states could not represent themselves in nonconflict cases seems a clear
violation of the basic principle of standing, which is that one plaintiff can-
not assert the rights of another. If federalism is a value that must have
adherents in court to insure proper compliance with the Constitution, how-
ever, then that value should more properly be represented by the states or
by the people in a class action since federalism is clearly a general political
right rather than a property right. The difficulty, of course, is that the peo-
ple had already been represented in the decisionmaking process through
their representatives in Congress, and thus only the states themselves re-
mained as proper plaintiffs. Yet, if in Massachusetts v. Mellon the Court
was correct in holding that unless a direct conflict exists the issue of
whether a federal regulation violates the tenth amendment is a political
question,20 then one has difficulty perceiving how the issue becomes a jus-
ticiable question merely because the regulation impacts private property.
Since the underlying legal concepts of substantive due process and federal-
ism have now somewhat lost their bite, one has equal difficulty perceiving
18. See supra note 9. In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the employer
raised the issue of whether the police power of the federal government could replace state
police power. In E C Knight the sugar trust again raised the issue of state jurisdiction rather
than its own rights against regulation. In Frothingham the Court concluded that:
In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff state is brought to the naked
contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several states
by the mere enactment of the statute, though nothing has been done and noth-
ing is to be done without their consent; andit is plain that that question, as it is
thus presented, is political, and not judicial, in character, and therefore is not a
matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial power.
262 U.S. at 483. The political question becomes legal only when a direct conflict exists. See
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
19. By using tenth amendment grounds, the courts avoided the more difficult question
of determining whether the exercise of governmental authority was justified when balanced
against private rights. Limiting federal authority may have been more difficult than limiting
state authority because under Justice Marshall's expansive view of the commerce clause in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), private rights were fully subject to
federal economic regulation whereas state power was limited by the contracts clause.
20. 262 U.S. 447, 482-83 (1923).
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how in the future the Court can allow attacks on federal legislation by
private property owners through the tenth amendment.
How, then, should the assertion that any citizen has the right to insist
that the government act within its powers be handled? Obviously, the
United States Supreme Court rejected this assertion in Frothingham v. Mel-
ion.21 Implicit in that rejection is the recognition that the Constitution
grants the power to Congress to spend for the general welfare and that any
attack on congressional spending must claim that the appropriation was
not for the general welfare. Justice Harlan's distinction in his dissent in
Flast v. Cohen22 is thus a useful one. In that dissent he wrote:
The national legislature is required by the Constitution to exercise its
spending powers to "provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare." Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Whatever other implications there may be
to that sweeping phrase, it surely means that the United States holds
its general funds, not as stakeholder or trustee for those who have
paid its imposts, but as surrogate for the population at large. Any
rights of a taxpayer with respect to the purposes for which those funds
are expended are thus subsumed in, and extinguished by, the common
rights of all citizens.23
Justice Harlan is clearly correct in concluding that taxpayers qua tax-
payers have no greater interest in governmental expenditures than anyone
else. On the other hand, that conclusion does not support Justice Harlan's
argument that congressional violations of the first amendment are not re-
viewable. Justice Harlan admitted as much when he conceded that non-
Hohfeldian plaintiffs, who act as private attorneys general, are not consti-
tutionally excluded from challenging governmental actions. 24 Under an
Hohfeldian analysis, there is a distinction between public rights and com-
mon rights. Furthermore, granting standing to private attorneys general
would lead to violations of the basic principle behind the standing require-
ment that a plaintiff cannot assert the rights of another.25
The purpose of the standing requirement derives from the legal process
itself. Within the legal process one person's rights can be described only in
terms of another person's rights; thus the Hohfeldian analysis exists in
which one person's right is another person's duty. Under this approach,
discussing a particular right except in terms of a particular duty is useless.
In negligence law, for example, only those persons whose risk of injury is
increased by a negligent act have a cause of action against the alleged neg-
ligent actor.26 Accordingly, Mrs. Palsgraf s injury was not compensated,
21. Id at 488.
22. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
*23. Id at 118-19.
24. Id. at 120; see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
25. See Hohfeld, supra note 7.
26. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). In tort law
a finding of no duty from a defendant to a plaintiff prohibits that plaintiff from contesting
the legality (negligence) of the defendant in the same way as a finding of no standing prohib-




because in terms of standing, she had no right to complain of the possible
negligence of the Long Island Railroad Company toward the person carry-
ing the explosives.
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, as in all standing cases, analysis
begins with the question of whether the complaining party's interest is
within the zone of interests meant to be protected by the rule claimed to be
violated. Justice Harlan's Flast v. Cohen dissent and the basic historical
standing approach used by the Court provide a statement of how standing
is to be decided in public rights cases, that is non-Hohfeldian, nonprivate
property cases. According to Justice Harlan:
It does not, however, follow that suits brought by non-Hohfeldian
plaintiffs are excluded by the "case or controversy" clause of Article
III of the Constitution from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This
and other federal courts have repeatedly held that individual litigants,
acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as "representa-
tives of the public interest." Scripps-Howard Radio v. Comm'n., 316
U.S. 4, 14. See also Commission v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470, 477; Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694; Reade v. Ew-
ing, 205 F.2d 630; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.,
123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994. Compare Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Comm'n., 330 U.S. 127, 137-139. And see, on actions qui tam,
Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225; United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 546. The various lines of authority are by no
means free of difficulty, and certain of the cases may be explicable as
involving a personal, if remote, economic interest, but I think that it
is, nonetheless, clear that non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs as such are not
constitutionally excluded from the federal courts. The problem ulti-
mately presented by this case is, in my view, therefore to determine in
what circumstances, consonant with the character and proper func-
tioning of the federal courts, such suits should be permitted. 27
The difficulty with both the typical Supreme Court majority analysis and
with Harlan's dissent is the assumption that a coherent analysis in public
law cases can be developed without reference to the same kind of analysis
in fifth amendment cases.
The two leading cases cited by Justice Harlan in Flast v. Cohen are ex-
amples of the confusion inherent in the current judicial treatment of pri-
vate attorneys general who represent the interests of others. In both
Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station28
and Scripps-Ho ward Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission29
the Supreme Court gave a confused analysis of standing because it failed
to recognize that public or common rights may exist either by statute or
constitutionally. Thus, in Sanders the Court held that the Communica-
tions Act of 193430 did not protect the interest of a broadcasting competitor
27. 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968).
28. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
29. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
30. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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in being free of competition. 31 The Court nevertheless allowed Sanders
Brothers Radio Station to represent the public.32 The Court made a
specific finding that the purposes of the Communications Act of 1934 did
not include the radio station's interest within the zone of interests meant to
be protected, and further, that the common law granted no protection
against fair competition. The Court made these findings by giving some
meaning to section 402(b)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934, which
grants the right of appeal to "any other person aggrieved or whose interests
are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission granting or re-
fusing any such application. ' 33 At the same time, the Court naively said
that the radio station must be given standing, otherwise section 402(b)(2)
would have no reference. 34 This assertion is, of course, untrue. The major
purpose of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensing is to
confine clear channel broadcasting and to prevent interference of signals.35
Thus section 402(b)(2) refers to any existing station that believes that an
assignment to a new station on the radio spectrum will interfere with its
existing broadcasting signal. Hence, finding in section 402(b)(2) a congres-
sional desire to allow a competitive station to raise any question of law
relevant to an FCC order seems completely inappropriate to normal judi-
cial supervision. The justification given by the Court is that only a com-
petitive station has sufficient interest to attack the FCC's order.36 This
justification is valid only if the real parties in interest are prevented from
representing themselves. Moreover, if the issue is whether the new station
can adequately serve the public, then depending upon a party whose inter-
est is adverse to the public's to represent the public is inappropriate. Simi-
larly, when a class action can be filed, calling instead upon an existing
monopolist to represent consumers is extraordinary, since consumers nor-
mally are satisfied to have additional services granted. Further, if other
broadcasters who wish to serve the community have been refused permis-
sion to broadcast, they clearly can appeal under section 402(b)(1). 37
The only conclusion that can be drawn from this sleight of hand is that
because of the Frothingham requirements, the Court could not conceive of
the public representing itself. Hence, the Court felt obligated to provide a
substitute plaintiff, albeit a clearly inadequate one. The Court did riot con-
sider allowing the public to represent itself even though: (1) the licensing
standard under the Communications Act of 1934 is to provide the best
practical service to the public, 38 and (2) the purpose of a three-year license
is to give the public ample opportunity to remove inadequate broadcast-
31. 309 U.S. at 475.
32. Id. at 477.
33. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(b)(2), 48 Stat. 1064, 1093 (currently
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1976)).
34. 309 U.S. at 477.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
36. 309 U.S. at 477.
37. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (1976).
38. Id. § 307(a).
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ers.39 Certainly, a class or an organization could raise these issues, if the
Court had recognized a common right to such service. Assuredly, a class
can more adequately represent the needs of the public than can an existing
competitor interested in retaining its monopoly position. Instead, what the
Court did was change a statute that allowed for competitive entry, limited
only by physical necessity, to a system of limited entry based upon a show-
ing of substantial economic injury to the existing competitor. Thus the
case that is heralded as a reform that allows public representation against
government action is, in reality, a change in the substantive law that allows
a competitor in the broadcasting industry to raise the issue of his economic
viability in terms of overall service to the public. What is difficult to per-
ceive is how a procedural section, such as section 402(b)(2) can properly
give rise to such a substantive right.
Unlike Sanders, the plaintiff in Scripps-Howard was not suing as a com-
petitor in the same market, but brought suit only to protect its space on the
radio dial, the very purpose of section 402(b)(2).40 Hence, this case cannot
in any way support the concept of private attorneys general. In Scripps-
Howard public rights were implicated only because the Court did not con-
ceive of the right to a frequency as a private right, since the airways are
public. In contrast to Sanders, the station in Scripps-Howard was repre-
senting its own interest in broadcasting free from radio interference rather
than the public's interest in receiving service from a particular station.
Again in Associated Industries v. Ickes4l the plaintiff, an association of
coal consuming industrial and commercial firms, was seeking to protect its
own interest, not that of the public, in the price of coal. The public interest
concept was used simply to avoid the argument that consumers of coal had
no standing to object to government price fixing.42 Clearly, the interest of
a consumer in a free market system is protected by the common law and
by the antitrust laws. The Court had never previously held that the mere
fact that all consumers of a particular commodity were injured equally by
an agreement in restraint of trade, or injured by a monopoly, prevented
such consumers from having a cause of action, either as a class or individ-
ually. Hence, if a statute that reduced consumer choices were passed for
the benefit of producers, the minimum expectation is that injured consum-
ers would have standing to attack the statute. Allowing some other party
with a different interest, such as one of the members of the conspiracy, to
39. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 109-
10 (1973). The statute was amended in 1981 to change the term from three years to five
years. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976), amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 1241(a), 95 Stat. 736.
40. 316 U.S. at 19. Put another way, Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. was a "person ag-
grieved" by the FCC's application of the law, since the purpose of the law was to protect
Scripps-Howard's interest. Its interest, however, was a mere license, and not a property
interest in terms of Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
41. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other groundsper curiam, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). For
further discussion of this decision, see infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
42. See City of Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939), a similar case decided without
reason or opinion, in which the Court upheld a denial of standing for consumers.
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bring the action on behalf of the consumers is nonsensical. 43 Thus, al-
though the Ickes opinion uses the public interest garb, it really stands for
the concept that persons directly affected by a statute (in this case, their
ability to shop in a free market) have standing to object to a price fixing
scheme.4"
The problem of recognizing a claim of right that is indistinguishable
from all other claims of right is endemic to any analysis of interests other
than those protected by the fifth amendment. 45 The analytical difficulty
occurs because of a failure to recognize that article III, section 2 of the
Constitution grants to courts the power to settle disputes, thus limiting the
court's power to issues that are appropriate to judicial decision.46 Article
III, section 2, however, does not limit review to a particular kind of claim.
Furthermore, in section 2, "cases" refers to subject matter without regard
to parties, whereas "controversies" refers to parties without regard to sub-
ject matter. Thus, as far as the federal courts are concerned, any person
may bring an action under the Constitution and laws of the United States
if his claim is a claim that is appropriate for judicial decision. In order to
determine that issue, which is the standing issue, one must determine
whether any particular claim is ordinarily cognizable in court.
The most obvious claims that are cognizable are those that were tradi-
tionally decided in common law actions. In these cases the plaintiff would
allege that the defendant had breached a duty and that the breach of duty
had- caused damage to the plaintiff. In answer to the complaint, the de-
fendant could demur, claiming either that he did not have such a duty or
that the facts alleged did not show a causal connection between the breach
of duty and the injury claimed. The second issue is implicated in standing.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts refers to this issue as legal cause,47 and
in many tort cases, it is called proximate cause.48
The demurrer is a preliminary motion that if granted, avoids a determi-
nation of whether an alleged duty of the defendant was in fact breached.
A decision on this issue is not a decision on the merits; whether in fact the
defendant did violate a particular duty or, in some cases, whether a duty
existed is simply not determined. Instead, the decision is a determination
that on the facts alleged by the plaintiff a duty may have existed and al-
though the defendant may have breached that duty, the purpose of the
43. The only argument for denial of standing is that the government's actions were part
of its normal operations and, therefore, private interests had no standing to complain about
the effect of ordinary governmental operations. In Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936),
a case concerned with the sale of surplus government property, the purpose of the govern-
mental action was clearly regulatory (an assurance of a return to producers) and therefore
properly reviewable under a person aggrieved standard.
44. For similar cases, see Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), discussed
infra notes 159-60, 162-64 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 10.
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (1965).
48. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 244 (4th ed. 1971).
[Vol. 36
STANDING
duty was not to protect the plaintiffs interest. The conclusion, therefore, is
that the plaintiff has no right to have a court determine whether the alleged
duty existed or whether it was breached, since under the given circum-
stances a court may not grant him compensation.
This analysis is in essence the standing analysis. In this analysis, the
court cannot avoid construing the nature and breadth of the alleged legal
duty to determine whether the plaintiff has made a colorable claim that
comes within the court's protection. This concept is what Justice Douglas
described in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp4 9 as the "zone of interests to be protected." Whether the claim
arises under the common law, a statute, or the Constitution is irrelevant;
the analysis remains the same. In each instance, the court must determine
the greatest possible protection that the duty might confer and then con-
sider whether the plaintiff can allege facts that would colorably bring him
within the zone of protection. Under the common law, this analysis may
at different times involve different zones of protection. At one point, for
example, trespassers were not granted standing to determine whether the
acts of landowners were negligent, since at that time the calculus used to
determine negligence of landowners was based upon their duty to business
invitees. In statutory cases, a newly imposed duty may very well devolve
upon groups that were previously excluded from the reach of the common
law rule. Similarly, licensees may at times be considered beneficiaries of
statutory standards imposed upon landowners.50 Analysis must, however,
49. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
50. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 194-95, 197 (4th ed. 1971):
In many cases the evident policy of the legislature is to protect only a lim-
ited class of individuals. If so, the plaintiff must bring himself within that
class in order to maintain an action based on the statute. Thus a factory act
providing that dangerous machinery, or elevators, must be guarded, may be
clearly intended only for the benefit of employees, and so afford no protection
to others who enter the building. Statutes requiring railroad trains to whistle
for crossings are to protect those who are about to cross, and not parallel traf-
fic, and the ordinary rules of the highway are not for the benefit of those on
the sidewalk. It is generally agreed that regulations governing the condition of
land or buildings are to protect only those who are rightfully upon the prem-
ises, and not trespassers. The class of persons to be protected may of course be
a very broad one, extending to all those likely to be injured by the violation.
Thus a statute requiring druggists to label poisons, a pure food act, a law
prohibiting the sale of firearms to minors, or an ordinance against leaving
horses unattended in the street, must clearly be intended for the benefit of any
member of the public who may be injured by the act or thing prohibited.
Sometimes the courts have disagreed over a broad and a narrow construction
of similar statutes, as where a provision requiring that parked cars shall be
locked has been held to be intended, and not to be intended, for the protection
of a person run down by a thief escaping with a stolen car.
A much more reasonable attitude is that of the New York court in a
decision holding that an act requiring elevator shafts to be guarded covered
the risk of objects falling down the shaft, to the effect that the accident need
only be included within the same general risk, or class of risks, at which the
statute is directed. Thus in the absence of any other guide, a statute may well
be assumed to include all risks that may reasonably be anticipated as likely to
follow from its violation. There are, however, occasional cases which have
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consider the purpose and extent of the statutory protection.
Data Processing, of course, laid the groundwork for the approach sug-
gested in this Article. In Data Processing Justice Douglas finally gave
meaning to the words person "aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute." What Douglas meant is that if a govern-
ment official has discretion or is granted authority to issue an authoritative
construction of a regulation, statute, constitutional provision, or act, and a
party has an interest that will be diminished by the official's action or by
his authoritative construction, then that person is aggrieved by such action
or construction. Such interests are divided from legal interests, because in
most cases individual interests arise solely out of the claimed construction
of the statute. Thus if the judicial determination is that the official's inter-
pretation is correct, then, following the interpretation, the losing party has
no interest. A legal interest arises, therefore, only after a judicial determi-
nation that the party's construction is correct. For this reason, Douglas
said in Data Processing that the legal interest goes to the merits of the case.
The term legal interest, however, did not originate in Data Processing.
Instead, it originated in cases involving judicial review of the exercise of
the police power or of other delegated governmental powers, powers that
infringe upon existing legal and constitutional rights. In the latter cases,
courts were asked to test the legitimacy and need for the government's
exercise of power by balancing it against the loss or restriction of private
rights. Standing to demand this balancing arose from the existence of a
private right. These cases are the familiar fourth and fifth amendment
cases. 51 They are quite distinct from cases in which the claimed rights
exist only in the statute or constitutional provision being interpreted, or in
which the issue is whether the government is acting within the confines of
due process or equal protection. Procedural due process and equal protec-
tion claims fit into the latter category of cases if the person is aggrieved
because under an official interpretation he is not entitled to the particular
process claimed or assignment to a particular category. For the purposes
of article III, section 2, the issue is appropriate for judicial resolution and
does not result in an advisory opinion. In many cases, a decision that the
person aggrieved does not have a legal or constitutional interest will fore-
close others from continually raising the same issue (stare decisis) just as
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Pa/sgraff foreclosed other plaintiffs from
making claims based soley upon injury in fact.
Although in Data Processing the Court seemed to expand standing radi-
gone to an extreme, and apparently have included all risks which would occur
to anyone as possible, following the violation. A broad purpose of maximum
protection, found as the basis of the statute, will of course encourage such an
interpretation.
Id (footnotes omitted).
51. Standing in police power cases is limited to persons holding existing legal interests
because the nature of the police power regulations is to limit such interests in the interest of
the public's health, welfare, or safety. Others may not object because they could not object
to other persons doing the same thing as the government proposes to do. By its very nature,
the police power limits existing legal rights.
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cally, the Court in fact simply recognized that the rules of standing as ap-
plied to legislatively enacted laws cannot appropriately be applied to an
administrative agency's rules. Conceptually, every person has input into
the political process. Hence, when a law is passed, only persons whose
constitutional rights of life, liberty, and property are affected can constitu-
tionally complain. Persons who are merely disadvantaged or injured in
fact rather than in law do not have standing to declare the law unconstitu-
tional. By contrast, when the lawmaking function is delegated to an ad-
ministrative agency to make rules according to some general guideline and
posited upon some particular finding of fact, the nature of the input by the
affected parties differs greatly.
In the political process, parties can lobby for a particular law, whereas in
the administrative process, the parties are restricted to presenting evidence
and arguing that some rules fulfill legislative purposes better than others.
Standing in an administrative law context, then, is standing to object to the
decisions of the administrator as contrary to law because the rules adopted
do not carry out the alleged legislative purpose, or because on the facts, the
evidence does not support the finding.
A person aggrieved by an administrative decision is a person who was
contemplated either to be helped or regulated by the agency and who is
adversely affected by the processes of the agency. In administrative law
the person is aggrieved rather than legally injured because if a court up-
holds the agency determination, then the person has no claim that his legal
rights (his constitutionally protected rights) are violated. A person ag-
grieved is claiming that the agency was in truth acting illegally in making
its decision and that he in fact had a legal right, granted by the very statute
in issue, to have the agency act according to law. This is true only if the
agency's action will affect his rights as granted by the particular statute or
his prior rights as redefined by the statute.
This distinction is most easily discerned in rate regulation of businesses
affecting the public interest. If the legislature sets a utility rate, the utility
has standing to attack the legislation as confiscatory and violative of the
utility's just compensation rights under the fifth amendment. On the other
hand, if after a hearing, a public service commission is granted power to
set compensatory rates, the sole issues are whether the rates are indeed
compensatory and whether the facts found by the commission are sup-
ported by evidence.5 2 Furthermore, if the statute is construed to be for the
benefit of consumers, the consumers can appeal the same administrative
decision as inconsistent with a law protecting their interests.5 3 Thus al-
though both parties have no legal right to object to a utility rate set by a
52. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Kansas-Nebraska
Natural Gas Co. v. City of Sidney, 186 Neb. 168, 181 N.W.2d 682 (1970); In re Towne Hill
Water Co., 139 Vt. 72, 422 A.2d 927 (1980).
53. See, e.g., State ex rel. Utility Consumers Council of Missouri, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1979); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
413 N.E.2d 359, 433 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1980); Office of Consumer's Council v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 50 U.S.L.W. 2051 (Ohio 1981).
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legislature, they have a right as persons aggrieved to object to a compara-
ble decision of a government agency as not in conformity with a law
passed for their benefit. A gas company, however, cannot object to the
processes of arriving at the electric rate,. unless the statute can colorably be
construed as intended to protect competing sources of energy. For the pur-
poses of article III, this definition of a person aggrieved insures that the
party who raises a legal issue is claiming a legal right, which is that an
agency deciding a question that will effect the party will do so in accord-
ance with law.
Under this analysis, one other group is granted standing to challenge the
utility rate even though to some extent its interests would not be within the
zone of interests protected by a particular statute. For example, in Associ-
ated Industries v. Ickes purchasers were granted standing to attack a stat-
ute setting minimum prices.54 The purchasers had previously been
protected from free market competition by a producers' firm agreement on
a minimum price. The new law removed that protection and provided that
a government agent could now set the price, which producers were thereaf-
ter prohibited from setting. Under similar circumstances, at least for the
purpose of testing the constitutionality of a statute or an alleged extension
of the operation of a statute, a person whose existing statutory or common
law rights have been curtailed or destroyed by a statute has standing to
attack the validity and breadth of application of the statute. This attack is
essentially a one-shot assault, since once the statute has been authorita-
tively construed and rights have been found to be extinguished by the stat-
ute, the interest claimed usually can no longer support standing for further
attacks. 5" Under circumstances such as those in Ickes, however, the stat-
ute itself might grant standing (of course, not to attack the statute) if the
purpose of the statute is to fix reasonable rates or otherwise to protect the
consumer as well as the producer.56 In such cases, the only reason not to
grant standing is that the statute provides for an inconsistent method of
enforcement. Thus if a statute either creates new rights or modifies ex-
isting rights, by its own terms it may also designate how those rights
should be determined. In such cases, both standing and the interest to be
protected are controlled by the statute.
54. 134 F.2d 694, 705-06 (2d Cir.), rep'd on other grounds per curiam, 320 U.S. 707
(1943).
55. Confusion arises from the fact that the courts do not distinguish situations in which
the government is carrying on its own business and those in which the government is acting
as a regulatory agency. In the first situation, the government may decide to sell surplus
property as it did in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). In such cases, others in the
market cannot complain about the competition. On the other hand, the government may
decide to sell for the purpose of regulating private rights as it did in Tennessee Elec. Power
Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). The purpose of that sale was regulatory. Because the
regulation affected private rights, standing should have been granted to private parties, since
unlike the government, no private party can legally engage in regulatory activities. When
economic regulation benefits one group to the detriment of another, the regulation can at
least be attacked on the grounds that no justification exists for the regulation or that the
means chosen are not properly tailored to the legislative ends.
56. In administrative law, the person aggrieved falls in this category.
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The problem of deciding standing in cases involving the exercise of gov-
ernmental power, as opposed to cases involving the modification of private
rights by statute, has been compounded by the Supreme Court's failure to
understand the nature of the claimed rights. The Court has assumed that
only rights or interests protected by the fifth amendment are worthy of
protection. Under that assumption, the Court has excluded from protec-
tion those interests affected by governmental action that is normally
shielded by sovereign immunity. Thus the rights accorded protection are
the liberty interests of contract and property affected by the police power,
as opposed to rights related to reputation and competitive interests pro-
tected only by tort law. What has happened, especially on the federal
level, is a retreat by the federal courts from reviewing exercises of state
police power. Hence, after Ferguson v. Skrupa,57 no one has standing to
raise the issue of substantive due process. The explanation for this phe-
nomenon is simple.
The fifth amendment uses words that are clearly translatable to the ordi-
nary experience of courts. Life, liberty, and property are all concepts that
exist at common law. Furthermore, the courts recognized from the begin-
ning that the danger from the state was through invasion of these basic
rights. The way in which these rights were ordinarily invaded was with the
state as plaintiff. Thus liberty was normally at issue in a criminal case and
property in an eminent domain case. The courts found no difficulty in
drawing analogies between interests protected by the fifth amendment in
cases brought by the government and interests of a similar nature in cases
brought by individuals. For example, liberty was analogized to the writ of
habeas corpus, and property was analogized to the action of eviction or of
trespass against a government official. The desire and need for this kind of
review increased during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hence,
fifth amendment substantive due process review replaced all other ap-
proaches to limiting governmental power. The courts perceived that only
claims bottomed in a taking of property without substantive due process
were sufficient to allow an action against a government. To meet this re-
quirement, the interest had to be unique to the individual (otherwise no
fifth amendment taking) and preemptively protected by the fifth amend-
ment. All other incursions by the government were not actionable, since
the government was protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Ex-
ceptions to this rule related, of course, to actions against individual gov-
ernment agents. Such actions could raise the constitutionality of the laws
under which the agents were acting, but only when the agents were acting
in furtherance of such laws.58 In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, for
57. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
58. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) pro-
vides a cause of action for damages for certain acts that, if authorized by law, would be
subject to the defense of sovereign immunity. Without the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff
would be limited to the declaratory or injunctive actions listed in Tennessee Elec. Power Co.
v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), in cases in which the action was authorized by state law, or to a
cause of action directly against the official. The latter alternative would be limited by
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example, the Supreme Court said:
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with direct
and special injury by the act of an agent of the government which, but
for statutory authority for its performance, would be a violation of his
legal rights, may challenge the validity of the statute in a suit against
the agent. The principle is without application unless the right in-
vaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of contract,
one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege. 59
The essential issues in cases cited by the courts in support of this propo-
sition were those involving the impairment of state or municipal contracts
or title disputes between government and private parties. 60 Some cases
directly involving the application of the equal protection clause were also
cited. The thrust of this proposition was that outside a claim of a specific
constitutional violation of one's property rights under the fifth or four-
teenth amendments, or a violation under the contracts clause of the Con-
stitution, no remedy was available against the government for injury to the
plaintiff's interest. Thus the normal rules of sovereign immunity applied,
unless a particular constitutional violation occurred. This approach does
not allow most persons injured by public action to bring the state into
court.
6 I
With the decline of substantive due process and judicial expansion of
the commerce clause, the possible range of review over state police power
regulations and claims under the tenth amendment shrunk while the
breadth of both state and federal activities increased. Meanwhile, changes
in the common law and statutory modifications of existing legal relation-
ships occurred in such areas as consumer protection, nuisance, and land
use. In all of these areas, new rights and obligations were created and, in
many cases, these were common rights and obligations. Further, with the
expansion of administrative agencies and governmental regulation, the
legislature granted standing in these areas partially to replace the old po-
whatever defenses state law provided for officials who acted in good faith or who made a
reasonable mistake while carrying out his duties.
59. 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939) (footnote omitted).
60. See supra note 7. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), for exam-
ple, involves impairment of state and municipal contracts, title disputes between government
and private parties, and equal protection issues.
61. Another explanation of these cases is that when performing its governmental opera-
tions (ie., in disposing of property, operating the police, licensing the airways, managing
government land) the government is protected by sovereign immunity and cannot injure
anyone, because no one can expect not to be affected by the normal operations of govern-
ment just as no one can expect not to be affected by the legal actions of a competitor. See
The Case of the Schoolmasters, Y.B. I Hen. 4, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410). What the Court missed
was that the purpose of the TVA was to regulate the industry by limiting pricing rather than
by merely selling surplus electricity as in Ashwander. The Court was not yet ready for a
doctrine that provided that the government should not prefer one group of citizens over
another for irrational reasons and that persons aggrieved by such governmental actions
should have standing to contest those actions. The issue, therefore, was not simply whether
the government could sell electricity, but whether the government should use its authority to
sell electricity effectively to set the rates of its private competitors through a willingness to
sell to its customers at prices that might be below cost.
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lice power review and partially to allow affected persons to have input into
the process that defined their interest. Even on a constitutional level, the
degree of citizen input increased as the power of the state increased, and
virtual representation by property holders seeking to limit state power di-
minished.62 The courts were asked to decide cases based not upon the
interests of the state or the interests of private parties, but upon the issue of
citizen input into legislative decisionmaking and citizen access to informa-
tion necessary for the intelligent exercise of political rights.63 Whether the
question arises under the common law, a statute, or under the Constitu-
tion, therefore, problems of standing are essentially the same, because the
essence of standing is rooted in the judicial process.
At the inception of our judicial process, the Constitutional Convention
rejected the model of the privy council, a structure that could invalidate
colonial legislation on the grounds that it was inconsistent with English
law,64 and established instead a judicial power extending to cases arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States and to controversies
between certain parties. 65 Judicial power is thus based upon the right of
one party to bring another into court. This arrangement is not like volun-
tary arbitration in which the parties must agree to the nature of the contro-
versy and the jurisdiction of the court. Neither is it like a rulemaking
procedure in which persons gather together to suggest a solution to a prob-
62. The theory of virtual representation was developed in England to justify "rotten
boroughs" and was used as well to justify not granting representation to the colonies. The
theory is based upon the concept that persons holding similar interests will adequately rep-
resent the interests of others not before the court.
63. These concepts came to fruition in administrative law through the Administrative
Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.), the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), and the Sunshine Laws.
Through these statutes, the interests affected were given the right to submit information and
the concomitant right to have such information considered in rulemaking. Standing de-
pended, therefore, upon the right of input rather than upon the effect of a regulation upon
property interests. Rights based upon these statutes belonged to the public generally. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), in which Justice White wrote:
Since virtually any document not privileged may be discovered by the appro-
priate litigant, if it is relevant to his litigation, and since the Act clearly in-
tended to give any member of the public as much right to disclosure as one
with a special interest therein . . . it is reasonable to construe, Exemption 5 to
exempt those documents, and only those documents, normally privileged in
the civil discovery context.
Id at 148-49 (footnote omitted).
64. S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 56-57 (1980):
At this time the activities of the colonial legislatures were circumscribed by the
"Instructions" to the "Royal Governors," the Chief Executives of the colonies.
These Instructions were written directions given by the King to his appointed
governors, and, because they set certain limits on what the Governors and
Colonial Legislatures could do, they were primitive analogues of our modern
State and Federal Constitutions. See Generally L. Labaree, Royal Instruc-
tions to British Colonial Governors (2 vols., 1935). The King also had the
power of "Disallowance," the right to set aside any law passed by the assem-
bly of one of the colonies. When the King formally approved of an Act, it was
said to be "confirmed." In deciding whether to confirm or to disallow an Act
the King was advised by various officials, including the Privy Council and a
special committee for the colonies, the "Board of Trade."
65. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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lem. The judicial power arises from a court's obligation to settle a dispute
appearing as a plaintiffs claim that the defendant has failed to grant the
plaintiff his legal due and a denial by the defendant of the plaintiffs claim.
The declaration of law by the court arises only because of its power to
settle disputes according to claims of right. 66
Other entities settle disputes, but such entities need not declare who is
right and who is wrong. Mediators, for example, settle disputes by bring-
ing the parties to an agreement. 67 The requirement that courts make deci-
sions in accordance with claims of right leads to the standing requirement.
As noted above, this aspect of the judicial process was recognized by Jus-
tice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison when he acknowledged that his
power to declare unconstitutional a statute of Congress arose solely in the
context of a dispute in which he was obligated to determine what law ap-
plied. 68 Marshall had two sources of law: an act of Congress and article
III, section 2 of the Constitution. The plaintiffs claim arose out of the
statute and thus would have to be granted if the statute were valid.69 De-
claring a statute invalid, without a claim that the statute infringes upon
some right, is not an exercise of the court's power to settle disputes. Such a
declaration would have to be bottomed upon some other grant of power.
Only the explicit grant of dispute settlement power allows a court to review
a legislative act. Without that grant of power, courts cannot claim the su-
perior competence or wisdom requisite to support a power of review. Only
absolute necessity justifies the exercise of such power, and the standing
requirement can assure proper application of that power.
Within the legal process very few clear rights and duties exist. As
Hohfeldian analysis illustrates, every right assumes a duty, but the lines
between these rights and duties are not self-executing. 70 The factual con-
text of any particular problem may require different answers without any
change of principles. Hence, before a court can authoritatively decide an
issue, the real parties in interest must appear to present the court with the
facts. Moreover, sources of law are found in the practices and the expecta-
tions of the parties, and rights not asserted in a particular case may be
deemed waived and lost forever. For one person to presume to assert the
rights of another is, therefore, generally inappropriate, because that other
person may not wish to assert his rights or because without the appropriate
66. H. HART & A. SACHS, supra note 6, at 423.
67. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc.
REV. 63, 69 (1974). Felstiner's article points out that the difference between mediation and a
judicial resolution is that in the former the parties compromise and neither party is consid-
ered right, whereas in a judicial resolution one party is found to be right, since resolution
depends upon a claim of right.
68. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
69. Admittedly, Justice Marshall substituted one separation of powers argument for an-
other. The government's position was that the executive was immune from a court manda-
mus order in the granting of commissions whereas the Court determined that the statute
authorizing the commissions violated the Constitution by imposing jurisdiction upon the
courts. Id at 175. Thus the tribunal itself raised a claim of right in dealing with its
jurisdiction.
70. Hohfeld, supra note 7, at 31-34.
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interest before the court, the court cannot accurately gauge the right as-
serted except in light of the defendant's arguments. The power of a court
to determine a case according to a claim of right is basic to the exercise of
judicial power; hence, the only persons who may assert such rights are the
persons who claim those rights for themselves.
The grant of standing for one issue cannot become a grant of standing
for all possible issues. In Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Corp., for example, the plaintiff builder could not raise the rights of
minority purchasers simply because he had standing to raise questions of
substantive due process concerning the denial of a rezoning request.7 ' On
the other hand, a person does not lose a right simply because he holds that
right in common with many other persons. A person has the right to ob-
ject to a curfew or to martial law even though the regulation affects every
other person in the community. A person also has the right to attend pub-
lic trials, to examine public records, to vote, to speak, and to be considered
for employment, even though all other persons similarly situated have the
same right.72 In this sense, the distinction that the Supreme Court at-
tempted to articulate in its dictum in Frothingham v. Mellon does not go to
the existence of common rights. Instead, the distinction goes to the review
of government action based on general claims of illegality that do not re-
late to any particular violations of a plaintiffs individual or common
rights. The plaintiffs objection to the particular expenditure in Frothing-
ham v. Mellon, for example, was based on the tenth amendment, a claim
determined to belong to the state or to the community and not to the plain-
tiff as a common right. Thus to have the expenditure rescinded, the plain-
tiff's only recourse was to act within the political community.
The distinction between legal and political rights, therefore, does not
relate to whether such rights are held in common or held individually.
Rather, the distinction relates to whether the political bodies or the courts
are assigned the job of ascertaining those rights and whether the decision is
based upon policy or a claim of right.73 The typical political reapportion-
ment problem will serve to clarify this distinction. If the question goes to
the appropriate structure of government, the issue is clearly a political one,
since the majority of voters has no right to any particular policy formu-
lated by the government. Thus, were the United States Senate to establish
a two-thirds requirement for cutting off Senate floor debate, such a rule
would at times frustrate the majority even as it protected the minority and
prevented hasty action. Likewise, if a political body decided that certain
decisions, such as issuing bonds binding on the government by amend-
71. 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977).
72. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (public trials);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (free speech); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (employment); Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 96 Wash. 2d 584, 637 P.2d 966
(1981) (right to inspect records).
73. See generally Rudolph, The Reapportionment Cases: A Conservative Defense of Indi-
vidual Rights, 43 NEB. L. REV. 854 (1964).
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ment, should require an extraordinary majority,74 that requirement would
clearly violate the theory of majority rule. Yet, it would properly be con-
sidered a policy question and not a question subject to a claim of right to
be asserted in court. In designing such procedures, various interests are
being served. What, then, is the rationale for granting individual voters
standing to attack malapportionment?
The right in question is the individual right to have input into govern-
ment. Based upon the white primary cases and other voting cases, 7 5 each
citizen clearly has such a right. Certainly the rationale behind the free
speech clause76 is that people must speak so that an informed electorate
can make responsible and intelligent decisions. If one has a right to input
into the governmental system, then the equal protection clause 77 can color-
ably be used to argue that everyone has a right to equal input into the
system and that any distinction must be justified by rational governmental
policy. The grant of standing to voters in the reapportionment cases,
therefore, is not based upon any theory that reapportionment is appropri-
ate, but on the notion that the equal protection clause prevents the govern-
ment from granting more voting rights to one person than to another.78
In F/ast v. Cohen, then, Justice Harlan is clearly correct in arguing that
the plaintiff had standing to bring suit as a citizen, but not as a taxpayer. 79
The issue in F/ast v. Cohen was the meaning of the Constitution's estab-
lishment clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion .. . ."80 The plaintiffs colorable claim was that the particular
appropriation was an establishment of religion. Even Justice Harlan ad-
mitted that the issue of a direct religious tax could be raised by taxpayers
as taxpayers. The difference between Flast v. Cohen and Massachusells v.
Mellon, however, is that the beneficiaries of the establishment clause are
clearly the residents of the United States who do not belong to the pre-
ferred religion. The right to the benefit is not based solely upon being
taxed for the support of a religion in which one does not believe, but upon
the promise to preserve a secular state that does not in any way prefer one
religion over another and indiscriminately allows all religions. Thus a res-
ident can object to public support of a particular religion whether or not
money is involved.
The theory of the lawsuit in Flast v. Cohen was that the activity was
74. For an example, see Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
75. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .. " See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
77. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "INlor shall any State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
78. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 318, 379 (1963). See generally Rudolph, supra note 73.
How then is the unequal representation of voters in the United States Senate justified? Orig-
inally, the purpose was equal representation of political communities rather than of individ-
ual voters. In the various reapportionment cases, the Court rejected that concept within the
states, but upheld it in limited federated governments based upon a metropolitan area or an
interstate compact.
79. 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ultra vires. The issue to be resolved by the Court was solely whether that
theory was valid. The anology made by the Court focused upon the right
of a stockholder to question an action of a corporation or to the right of the
member of an association to object when the association enters fields that
are not specified in the charter. The issue is not whether the corporation or
the association is spending money improperly, for it may in fact be making
money, but whether it is acting beyond the scope of the purposes of the
organization.8'
An even better analogy is to the settlor of a trust. The settlor does not
have any interest if money is lost in fulfillment of the purposes of the trust,
since he has given up all claim to the money. On the other hand, he does
have an interest that the trustee spend the money for the purposes of the
trust, and the settlor has standing to object if the trustee attempts to use the
funds for purposes clearly outside the purposes of the trust.82 Similarly, if
the people of the United States are perceived as settlors of a trust upon the
government, and the Congress and other members of the government are
perceived as trustees with wide discretion to govern for secular purposes in
the public interest, standing could be granted to any citizen to hold the
government to those secular purposes but standing could be denied to that
same citizen on the issue of whether a particular secular purpose is in the
public interest. The reason for this distinction is that the government is
given discretion to determine what is in the public interest, but not to de-
termine what is religious. The same issue could arise, for example, in a
charitable trust whose purpose is to care for the poor youth of Philadel-
phia. In such a case, the method and means of providing for poor youth
would not be subject to judicial attack by the settlor, but a decision to
establish an old people's home with the earmarked funds would be so
subject.8 3
This discussion is based upon a traditional exercise of judicial supervi-
sion relating to the jurisdiction of governmental bodies. Historically, the
King's courts issued writs of prohibition to other courts to insure that those
courts would stay within their jurisdiction, and it has been tradition that
courts exercise this supervisory power to keep agencies within their juris-
dictional limits even when the courts are not empowered to review the
operation of those agencies. Flast v. Cohen clearly comes within this tradi-
tion. The only unusual thing about the case was the person who brought
the action. As pointed out above, however, the establishment clause is col-
orably for the benefit of any citizen who wishes to insure that the United
81. See Byrne v. Schuyler Elec. Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336, 31 A. 833 (1895). See generally
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 969 (1965) (profitableness or nonprofitableness of transaction
that is ultra vires does not affect stockholder's right).
82. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200(b) (1959); see Stanley v. Colt, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall) 119 (1867).
83. See E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 36 (1917): "The jurisdic-
tion exercised over charitable trusts was avowedly limited to maintaining the original pur-
poses of the founder unimpaired. "d; see Estate of Jackson, 92 Cal. App. 3d 486, 155
Cal. Rptr. 380 (1979).
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States remain a secular state rather than for the benefit of one who objects
merely to having his money spent for religious purposes.
Because of Justice Harlan's dissent in Flast v. Cohen, a discussion of
standing must include a discussion of taxpayer standing. As Justice
Harlan stated, a federal taxpayer lacks standing because he has no more
interest in the federal treasury than has any other person. 84 Indeed, with
the growth of entitlements nontaxpayers as well as taxpayers have claims
upon the United States Treasury. By contrast, in nongovernmental law a
creditor does not have standing to object to spending by his debtor unless
the expenditure will impair some contractual security. 85 In corporate law,
a stockholder does not have standing until a demand for action is made
upon the directors and refused. In such cases, standing may yet be fore-
stalled by the business judgment rule, and thus the wisdom of corporate
policy, as opposed to the legality of such policy, is precluded from attack.86
The only proper analogy to the taxpayer suit, therefore, is to the actions
of a beneficiary of a trust. The beneficiary's claim is based upon the theory
that if illegal or improper payments are made, he will have less valuable
property for himself. The theory of the taxpayer's suit is almost the same.
Since the government's obligations are generally on a cash basis, any im-
proper payments would require an increase in taxes. Why states and spe-
cial and local governments have this rule is obvious. Governments usually
must function on a balanced budget.87 In the case of special and local
governments, moreover, financial objectives are minutely detailed and
nondiscretionary. The persons who must finance these objectives usually
do so because of a direct or nearly direct benefit to themselves. Thus ex-
penditures by a drainage district for nonrelated activities could and should
be much more clearly monitored than state expenditures for the general
welfare. In the realm of local government, then, every action may be per-
ceived as a jurisdictional question, that is, whether the activity was within
the specific, narrow grant of power. The separation between payors and
84. 392 U.S. 83, 119 (1968).
85. For example, the only interest a mortgage lender has is his security. If money is
deposited to cover his security, a sale may take place.
86. Stockholders have no rights in the legal disposition of corporate property. See First
Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932). Outside the ultra vires claim, stockholders may
attack or attempt to recover illegal payments in suits filed under the name of the corporation
only after a demand has been made upon the corporation and the corporation has refused.
See Hyams v. Old Dominion Co., 113 Me. 294, 93 A. 747 (1915). In secondary stockholders'
suits, the rights of stockholders are restricted by the business judgment rule. Hence, suits
can be brought to recover only clearly illegal payments (i e., payments that are clearly ultra
vires). See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979). The business judg-
ment rule is based upon the concept that directors who are unbiased and who know all
pertinent information have the right to control the corporation. The rule does not authorize
ultra vires or illegal acts.
87. Two examples of this process are the constitutions of Nebraska and Wisconsin.
Both constitutions place a specific limit on general obligation bonds that may be used for
cash flow purposes only. The state must maintain a balanced budget; hence, every expendi-
ture requires a tax. Because an illegal expenditure would also require imposition of a tax,
taxpayers have standing to attack such illegal expenditures. See NEB. CONST. art. XIII, § 1;
WIs. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
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beneficiaries is much narrower than the separation between federal tax-
payers and the national government. Moreover, local governments gener-
ally have little or no separation of powers and no official body capable of
checking improper behavior within the government.88
. In light of this narrow delegation of power and the trust theory of gov-
ernment, that courts have granted standing to taxpayers to challenge ex-
penditures by state and local governments is not surprising. On the state
level, comparable grants of standing have led to anomalous and divergent
results. Challenges to similar governmental activities have been treated
differently solely on the basis of whether or not an expenditure was in-
volved.89 For a more coherent result, standing should be granted on the
same basis as has been outlined above for federal cases. Thus when a
plaintiff is attacking state legislation, he should be required to claim not
only that the act was unconstitutional, but that the constitutional provision
claimed to be violated was for the purpose of protecting the plaintiff's in-
terest. The state taxpayer's suit should be limited to cases in which a spe-
cial fund has in fact been created for special purposes, and standing should
be limited to persons both paying for and benefitting from the special use.
In cases involving local governments, standing should be determined as for
administrative agencies, that is, either according to the statute creating the
agency or according to the statutory provisions requiring citizen input.
The approach outlined in this Article can also be used to deal with re-
cent cases concerning standing in separation of powers cases. In these
cases, the issue is the distribution of powers between the Congress and the
President, or the Senate and the President. The real party in interest is the
constitutional body itself and not a member of that body. Thus the mem-
bers of the body have no standing to object to a failure of the body to
assert its rights. A member of the constitutional body is analogous to a
stockholder who objects to a failure by the corporation to assert its rights
in a possible claim against a third party. Under the business judgment
rule, these claims would be rejected. The stockholder action, if any, would
have to be against the board of directors claiming that the board has a duty
to act. The action would be in the nature of a mandamus; otherwise no
cause of action exists. Similarly, when a disagreement arises between the
legislature and the executive branch, the issue is a political question, as it
was in Massachusetts v. Mellon, unless the legal implications of the deci-
sion by one body are in conflict with the legal implications of the decision
by the other body. Under this. approach, no standing exists, unless the
independent bodies have made irrevocable decisions.
88. When the delegation of authority to spend money is very specific, any expenditure
other than those specified is considered to be ultra vires.
89. New Hampshire Wholesale Beverage Ass'n v. New Hampshire State Liquor
Comm'n, 100 N.H. 5, 116 A.2d 885 (1955) (taxpayer granted standing even though no ex-
penditure involved); Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores Ass'n v. Kerngood, 171 Md.
426, 189 A. 209 (1937) (taxpayer standing denied on basis that no expenditure was involved
in governmental decision under attack).
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In Kennedy v. Sampson,9 for example, a United States Senator filed suit
against the Administrator of the General Services Administration and the
Chief of White House Records seeking a declaration that a particular bill
had become a validly enacted law and an order requiring defendants to
publish the bill as a validly enacted law. The duties of the defendants were
clearly ministerial and subject to a mandamus action. The issue for the
court, therefore, was simply whether the law had been legally enacted
under the Constitution of the United States and whether the defendants
should be required to publish it. The standing issue concerned who had
the right to request that the court decide the matter. In this case, the court
granted standing to the Senator and did not discuss his possible claim to
standing as a citizen. 91 A concurring opinion pointed out that the Senator
was an elected representative bringing this action for his constituents.92
Since the Senator had voted for the unpublished bill, there could be no
question that the necessary adversity existed. 93 The real issue, however,
was the identity of the proper party. Congress had done everything legally
necessary to enact the law; either the act was law, or it was not. In that
sense, Congress had no discretion left. Moreover, acts of Congress are not
for the benefit of Congress as such; hence, the institution itself cannot be a
proper party in a judicial forum.94 On the other hand, the duty to enforce
the laws is placed upon the President, and the remedy for his inaction is
not through the courts but through the impeachment process. In addition,
the officers of Congress, even after being directed by resolution, have no
greater interest in a purported law than any senator or the public at large.
Finally, for the two coordinate branches to appear as litigants in court
would be unseemly if not unconstitutional. In fact, sections 8 and 9 of
article I seem to indicate that bringing court actions is not part of congres-
sional power.95
In Reuss v. Balles,96 by contrast, the injury, if any, was to Congress or
the President. In Reuss a United States Congressman brought suit for de-
claratory and injunctive relief from the allegedly unconstitutional compo-
sition of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal
Reserve System. The Congressman was also the owner of certain marketa-
ble bonds. Since Congress had enacted legislation setting up the FOMC,
the issue was not whether congressional power had been lost, but rather
whether legislative power had been improperly delegated to a private or
partially private group. Based upon this Article's analysis, standing for
injury in fact would lie in the plaintiff as a bondholder. The court, how-
ever, rejected this contention on the basis that as a bondholder the plain-
90. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
91. Id at 435.
92. Id at 446.
93. Id
94. Article III does not seem to contemplate congressional actions in court. See U.S.
CONST. art. II1.
95. See id. art. I, §§ 8, 9.
96. 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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tiff's complaint was no different from that of any other citizen. 97 This
contention was a dictum in Frothingham v. Mellon and is clearly inappro-
priate. If the asserted rights were common rights or public rights, however,
the injury claimed (the loss of the value of the funds) was not causally
related to the alleged illegality. No evidence indicated that the decisions of
the FOMC would have been different, or that less rather than more infla-
tion would have resulted, if the nonappointed member had been appointed
by the President rather than elected. The court was correct in pointing out
that the injury, if any, was to Congress or to the President rather than to
the public or a member of the House.98 Close analysis shows that the pur-
ported injury was to the President, since it was his appointive power that
was eliminated by the statute.
Two recent Supreme Court cases illustrate how application of this Arti-
cle's analysis would give clear answers to the standing issue without raising
the question of whether the plaintiffs injury was common to others. In
both cases, standing was denied: once correctly and once incorrectly. In
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War99 the complaint al-
leged that certain members of the House and Senate were holding reservist
commissions in the armed forces and were, therefore, violating the dual
office provision of the Constitution. 00 Rather than analyze whether that
provision of the Constitution was for the general protection of citizens, the
Court denied standing on the basis that the injury was not unique to any
particular plaintiff.'0 ' Clearly, the provision is not designed as a direct
protection of citizens, since it mandates a separation of powers. The pur-
pose of the provision is to insure that the President cannot control the leg-
islative branch through the power of appointment and that members of the
legislative branch cannot use their positions to increase the "emoluments"
of any office to which the President might appoint them. A similar issue
was raised and decided by the Senate in a confirmation hearing on Senator
William B. Saxbe as Attorney General. The hearing was on a bill to re-
duce Senator Saxbe's pay until his former term as Senator had expired.10 2
The bill added a rider granting standing to any person aggrieved by ac-
tions of Saxbe as Attorney General to challenge his appointment. 0 3 The
appointment of Saxbe as Attorney General was, however, never judicially
attacked. In both Schlesinger and the Saxbe hearing, the issue was eligibil-
ity for office, not the policies of the individual after taking office. For that
97. Id at 469-70.
98. Id. at 469.
99. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 provides:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
increased during such time; and no person holding any office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in office.
101. 418 U.S. at 220.
102. S. 2673, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
103. Id
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matter, a close reading of Schlesinger indicates a narrow discretion to ex-
clude properly elected representatives. Thus Congress as an institution,
rather than the courts, is clearly expected to maintain the separation of
powers required by the dual office provision. As to Schlesinger, Congress
had already acted in a number of different instances to provide legisla-
tively that membership in the Reserves did not constitute dual office.' °4
Hence, the issue for the Court in construing the dual office provision was
whether someone other than Congress could have standing to attack Con-
gressmen for holding reserve commissions.
Since Congress clearly takes its separate power seriously, and since the
purpose of the dual office provision is to protect Congress rather than the
people, no one other than Congress should have standing. Furthermore,
the authority granted by the constitutional provision is not to be used in
court, but in the ordinary exercise of congressional power. Any other con-
clusion on standing would have contradicted the concepts that one person
cannot assert the constitutional rights of another and that a citizen qua
citizen does not have standing to question whether the Constitution has
been properly enforced. The Schlesinger Court actually rejected this latter
concept, not the concept that citizens having interests in common have no
standing.' 05 Moreover, the case was clearly filed against the wrong de-
fendant. The illegality, if any, was not in holding the position of an officer
in the Reserves, but in holding the congressional seat.' 06 If anyone else
wished to raise the issue, he would have to have done so in a quo warranto
action when the particular individual filed for election. Convicted felons
have been removed from the ballot by similar actions. Otherwise, the
question of the eligibility of elected Congressmen to take their seats or to
remain in their seats is committed to Congress rather than to the public in
general.
In United States v. Richardson '0 7 the Court denied a taxpayer standing
to object to the Central Intelligence Agency's alleged failure to account to
Congress according to the terms of article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Con-
stitution: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and
104. 32 C.F.R. § 125.4(c)(2) (1974); Department of Defense Directive 1200.7, § v., cl. 2
(July 2, 1970).
105. A recent case, McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho 1981), has an espe-
cially muddled opinion. It sets out a requirement that to have standing the plaintiff must be
injured in fact rather than in law. Id. at 269. If the court means what it says, then virtually
all third-party actions against defendants who have violated a statutory duty would have to
fail, since the plaintiff's right to sue derives. from a statutory grant, not from an injury in fact.
The court posited this standing requirement either to avoid declaring that the special juris-
dictional statute was an unconstitutional bill of attainder, or to decide on constitutional
grounds that Congress was the final arbiter of the meaning of the dual office provision of the
Constitution. Although avoiding decisions on constitutional issues is normally appropriate,
for the court to do so by proclaiming that to bring an action under article III, clause 2, a
plaintiff must show personal injury even though that plaintiff has statutory authority to
ring the action seems inappropriate.
106. The assumption in this case was that most persons held the commissions when
elected.
107. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public money shall be
published from time to time."' 10 8 Although no taxpayer has standing to
object to the actual expenditures, this particular provision is colorably, if
not explicitly, designed to assure the public's right to know. This provision
restricts Congress for the benefit of the public in the same manner that the
establishment clause restricts Congress as to the establishment of religion.
Standing has traditionally been granted to guarantee the public's right to
know. In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,0 9 for example, the Court
closed a preliminary hearing in supposed violation of the public trial rules.
The standing of the press in that case is certainly no different from the
standing of a citizen who seeks to require that public acts be performed
publicly by Congress. Arguably, the public had a greater right in Richard-
son than in Nebraska Press because the purpose of article I, section 9,
clause 7 is to make public officials accountable for their acts in the political
process. The basic genius of our free government is that public officials are
required to act publicly. In the trial situation, by contrast, the public char-
acter is arguably for the benefit of the defendant rather than the public,
and when judges are not elected, little reason to subject them to close pub-
lic scrutiny exists. Notwithstanding that the right to a public trial is for the
benefit of the defendant, the Supreme Court has held that the public has
standing to object to the closure of the trial." l0 If the public has this right
as secondary beneficiary of a defendant's right to a public trial, then a
fortiori the public has a primary right of access to the information neces-
sary for the intelligent exercise of its political rights. This policy of assur-
ing public access to information is the basis of the various freedom of
information acts and of the Court's interpretation of the first amendment.
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State"' l the Supreme Court recently demonstrated its continu-
ing failure to comprehend the doctrine of standing. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals had correctly held that respondents, the original plain-
tiffs, lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge a conveyance of surplus
government property under article IV, section 3, clause 2,112 but that re-
spondents did have standing as citizens claiming " 'injury in fact' to their
shared individuated right to a government that 'shall make no law respect-
ing the establishment of religion.' "113 The conveyance was to an educa-
tional institution operated by a religions order that trains people for the
ministry and for the spreading of Christian doctrine." 14 By reversing the
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
109. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
110. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
111. 102 S. Ct. 758 (1982), rev'g Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc. v. HEW, 619 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980).
112. 619 F.2d at 260; see infra note 122.
113. 619 F.2d at 261 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
114. It may be proper and within the implied powers for the United States to incorporate
a bank, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), or by a parity of reasoning,
to establish a university. But the United States can not charter a church even if federal
funds are not involved.
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court of appeals, the Supreme Court revealed its inability to distinguish
between fifth amendment property rights and first amendment establish-
ment rights. Notwithstanding the reapportionment cases and Fast v. Co-
hen, the Court assumed that for the purposes of article III no rights can be
held in common. The Court also forgot that in Richardson it had admitted
that Congress could grant standing if it granted a legal right to the pub-
lic,1 5 a concept completely at odds with the idea that standing in common
rights cases is prohibited by article III. If article III really does prohibit
Congress from granting standing in common rights cases, then under the
direct holding in Marbury v. Madison, Congress cannot grant standing as
suggested in Richardson, nor can it grant standing to the general public in
cases arising under the Freedom of Information Act." 16
The paucity of the Court's reasoning is self-evident:
Were we to recognize standing premised on. an "injury" consisting
solely of an alleged violation of a " 'personal constitutional right' to a
government that does not establish religion," 619 F.2d, at 265, a prin-
cipled consistency would dictate recognition of respondents' standing
to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a per-
sonal right to a government that does not impose cruel and unusual
punishment, or standing to challenge every affirmative action pro-
gram on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not
deny equal protection of the laws, to choose but two among as many
possible examples as there are commands in the Constitution.' 17
Clearly, the Court does not understand that certain provisions of the Con-
stitution protect individual rights, other provisions protect institutional
rights by insuring separation of powers, while still others protect political
or religious rights. In addition, the Court does not understand that a
standing decision requires the person claiming standing to show the nexus
between the violation of the Constitution and the right violated. Granting
standing in an establishment clause case because a colorable construction
of the first amendment includes a personal right in every citizen not to
have a religion governmentally established is quite distinct from the right
of one citizen to appeal the death sentence of another because he opposes
the death penalty. 1 8 Standing does not depend upon whether the person
claiming standing can be distinguished from the general public, 119 but
115. 418 U.S. at 193.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(I) (1976).
117. 102 S. Ct. at 767, n.26.
118. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). In this case the Court denied standing
to Gilmore's mother to represent either Gilmore or the public even though substantial ques-
tions concerning the legality of the execution remained unresolved.
119. As noted previously, injury in fact does not in itself justify standing. In Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977), for example, the Court held that
a corporation owning existing bowling alleys did not have standing under the vertical inte-
gration prohibitions of § 7 of the Clayton Act to object to Brunswick's acquisition of
financially troubled bowling alleys owned by the plaintifis competitors. The Court found
that the purpose of § 7 was to protect other equipment manufacturers from having their
market foreclosed rather than to protect competitors of the acquired bowling alleys. Id. at
487. Section 7 is designed to prevent mergers among competitors so as to limit competition
for their services and under the Kefauver Amendment to prevent vertical mergers if such
[Vol. 36
STANDING
upon whether the legal norm claimed to be violated was designed to pro-
tect the claim he asserts. What is now clear from the Court's opinion is
that Congress can declare the establishment of a religion, as long as no tax
money is directly appropriated, and provide for the appointment of minis-
ters without being subject to challenge by citizens who object. If in this
circumstance the political process is to be the public safeguard, then the
various otherwise useful provisions of the Constitution are not needed. Fi-
nally, by again magnifying the requirement of individual harm, the Court
continues to allow standing to persons who cannot make the claim that a
particular constitutional provision was designed to protect their particular
interest. One can only hope that an appropriate exegesis of standing can
convince at least one member of the majority to rethink the entire issue.
The inconsistency in the Supreme Court's application of standing rules
cannot long endure. Courts cannot continue to grant standing in public
trial cases and deny standing in cases concerning access to information.
Courts cannot insist in one case that Congress may grant standing to the
public and in another contend that standing is a question of constitutional
law. Neither can courts continue to grant standing arbitrarily to persons
who have an economic, aesthetic, or health interest, but who have no stake
in the outcome. Courts must instead seek to determine (1) the purposes of
the standard claimed to be violated (i.e., what interests can the standard
legitimately protect); (2) whether the interest of the attacking party can be
protected by a different constitutional interpretation; and (3) whether judi-
cial review is appropriate. For these purposes, the Constitution is no dif-
ferent than a statute; therefore, the same analysis applies to the various
provisions of the Constitution.
An examination of the leading standing cases shows how a consistent
approach can solve the problems of standing. Ashwander v. Tennessee Val-
leyAuthority, 20 a case in which the decision on standing is clearly wrong,
provides the starting point. In that case two preferred stockholders
brought a secondary stockholder suit to prohibit the purchase of certain
territorial rights from the company. The suit was brought on the basis that
the property was under threat of eminent domain and that the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) itself was illegally constituted. The plaintiffs
made no showing that the company was ill advised or that its board of
directors was not capable of making an appropriate decision. Under the
business judgment rule, such a showing is mandatory if standing is to be
granted to stockholders. 121 Moreover, since these particular stockholders
were preferred, their interests would not be diminished in any way by the
sale. If on the other hand the company had in fact resisted the takeover,
the issue would have been simply whether the United States, through Con-
gress, could dispose of its excess electricity. The authority of Congress to
mergers foreclose the market to competitors of the acquiring firm. For a full discussion, see
Rudolph, The Rationale Behind the Foreclosure Doctrine, 46 NEB. L. REV. 605 (1967).
120. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
121. See supra note 86.
1982]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
do so is clearly granted under article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion,' 22 and this disposition is peculiarly within the competence of Con-
gress. Moreover, article IV, section 3, clause 2 exists solely to assign a
particular responsibility to a particular branch of government, not to pro-
tect citizens.
Once standing was improperly granted in Ashwander, therefore, the ef-
fect was to allow persons with no economic interest to raise the issue of
whether Congress had power to dispose of its own property. In effect, the
Court was asked to give an advisory opinion when the only legitimate is-
sue for the Court was whether the company was entitled to just compensa-
tion. Since the United States had already paid just compensation,
however, there remained no right in the company to bring its case before
the Court. In terms of the standards prescribed by Data Processing 23 or
those proposed in this Article, the company was not within the zone of
interests meant to be protected by article IV, section 2, clause 2. The com-
pany could not, therefore, make a colorable claim that Congress's disposi-
tion of legally acquired property implicated whatever rights were retained
under the ninth amendment. 124
In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority 125 the de-
cision on standing was equally wrong. In that case the TVA was interfer-
ing with existing franchise relationships not for the purpose of selling
surplus government electricity, but for the alleged purpose of regulating
electric rates through yardstick pricing.' 26 As framed by the plaintiff
power companies, the issues were whether as a matter of policy the na-
tional government could regulate local electric rates in derogation of state
police power or regulate local electric rates of existing competitors through
yardstick pricing when such pricing might be below cost in violation of the
ninth, or possibly the fifth amendment.
Obviously, the electric companies had no standing to raise tenth amend-
ment claims since that right belongs to the states.' 27 Moreover, the compa-
nies admitted that they were subject to regulation. What they objected to,
however, was the regulation of their rates by the novel method of yardstick
pricing rather than by direct regulation. The government's claim did not
here rest upon article IV, section 3, clause 2, but rather must have rested
upon the commerce power.128 On the theory that the purpose of TVA leg-
122. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 provides: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose
of ... other Property belonging to the United States .
123. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. IX provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
125. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
126. Yardstick pricing was a concept developed by Harole Ickes to limit the prices
charged by private public utilities to consumers. The government would sell the product as
an example of prices private public utilities should charge; if compliance by offering lower
prices by the private utilities was not forthcoming, the government would offer the private
utility customer the lower priced product.
127. See supra note 11.
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: "The Congress shall have Power ...To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
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islation is to control the rates charged by private utilities, recognizing that
the law directly affected the utilities' interests and that the proper interpre-
tation and implementation of that law were, therefore, subject to judicial
review according to judicial standards should not have been difficult. Fur-
ther, the constitutional question of whether the commerce power included
the power to regulate indirectly through competition rather than directly
through rate regulation was certainly judicially determinable at the in-
stance of the targeted companies.
The difference between these two cases is obvious: The general disposal
of governmental property, like going-out-of-business sales in the private
sector, is not for the purpose of affecting others, even when it has that
result. Under the law both the disposal of governmental property and the
going-out-of-business sales are justified as necessary to carry out lawful
pursuits and are not subject to judicial review, even when they have seri-
ous effects on others. By contrast, private parties generally do not attempt
to enter business in order to regulate other businesses, and when the main
thrust of a private business is to injure or destroy another business, its
efforts are actionable. Similarly, because governmental attempts to regu-
late business do to some extent injure or destroy businesses, that the nature
and extent of the regulation must be justified in terms of furthering some
public interest is generally recognized. Hence, a decision on standing re-
quires at least a preliminary inquiry as to whether the plaintiffs interest is
targeted by the government or whether the invasion of the plaintiffs inter-
est is merely incidental to a legitimate government purpose.129
Summarizing these two cases in terms of the methodology proposed, the
Tribes." Article IV, section 3, clause 2, conversely was the basis for the government's au-
thority in Ashwander. The majority opinion in Tennessee Electric does not mention any
authority for the TVA. The TVA Act itself is allegedly based on the authority of the govern-
ment to control navigable waters. The complaint, however, alleged that the purpose of the
programs was regulation of prices through yardstick pricing. The only authority for such
regulation is the commerce clause. The failure to grant standing allowed the Court to avoid
examining whether the actions contemplated were authorized by federal control over navi-
gable waters or the commerce clause.
129. The restrictive standing doctrine of Tennessee Electric was seemingly modified in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). The decision in that
case is clearly inconsistent with Tennessee Electric. In both cases the acts of the government
targeted particular private entities and affected the ability of the private entities to perform
lawful functions. These cases differ from the normal situation in which the government is
merely carrying out governmental activities that may affect others, but which are not per-
formed for the purpose of affecting others. Hence, the issue in such cases does not involve
the general authority of the government to act for its own benefit, but involves its power to
regulate (or punish) other persons. The reasoning in Joint Anti-Fascist League led to the
development of a line of cases involving due process rights of employees if the government
termination involved a stigma. Eg., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). In Paul v. Davis the plaintiff did not have standing to
complain about the overall policy of the government (although he may have had a claim for
damages or just compensation), whereas in Wisconsin v. Constantineau he might have re-
quired (i) that the policy be justified under the police power or some other governmental
power as weighed against his interest; or (2) that his interest not be affected without appro-
priate factual determinations. Moreover, in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, the as-
sumption was that when a governmental action directly affects a particular individual, a
reasonable basis for that action must exist. 341 U.S. at 141-42.
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standard claimed to be violated in Ashwander, article IV, section 3, clause
2, does not implicate private rights, but speaks only to the government's
right to sell its property. That such a sale would result in injury in fact is,
therefore, irrelevant, since the interest of the attacking party could not be
protected by a different interpretation of article IV, section 3, clause 2. As
for judicial review, Congress's discretion to dispose of surplus property
under article IV is not otherwise limited by the Constitution (except in
some circumstances by the establishment clause or the equal protection
clause), and therefore, no standards are available for judicial balancing of
interests.
By contrast, Tennessee Electric is a clear exercise of the regulatory power
targeted at the plaintiffs. The Court's assumption in Ashwander that the
ninth amendment right to do business free from government competition
could mean in Tennessee Electric that the government can regulate busi-
ness through competition is clearly a jump in logic. In Tennessee Electric
the applicable constitutional provision was the commerce clause, not arti-
cle IV, section 3, clause 2. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the governmen-
tal regulation had to be justified by balancing the evil to be eradicated
against the company's reasonable expectations. Such balancing had been
the staple of courts reviewing regulatory statutes. Thus, although the in-
terest impacted was exactly the same in both cases, the decision to deny
standing was wrong in Tennessee Electric because it did not relate to the
government's constitutional power to act, but focused instead on the inter-
est impacted.
The classic case of denial of standing in the latter situation is Perkins v.
Lukens Steel.' 30 At the time Perkins was decided, the Court's decision on
standing was correct because bidding laws were for the benefit of the bid-
der, not the person bidding. For example, if a company like Sears, Roe-
buck issued a bidding manual to its buyers, a potential seller to Sears had
no legal complaint if the manual was not followed. Sears management
might fire the buyer, but the disappointed seller could not claim the profits
from the lost sale.' 3 ' Government procurement laws and regulations were
viewed in the same manner: to deal with internal matters, Congress passed
general laws for the instruction of its agents only. In Perkins the govern-
ment's laws had one additional purpose: the laws affected wage rates gen-
erally through a yardstick approach. The beneficiaries of these laws were
intended to be the workers on government projects, not the contractors.
The complaint, however, was that for the purposes of determining mini-
mum wages, the Secretary of Labor assigned particular contractors, pursu-
ant to statutory authority, to particular localities that might be
disadvantageous on a cost basis in preparing bids. The issue was whether
potential bidders had standing to object to the rates proposed by the Secre-
130. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
131. Under § 90 of THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981), one possible




tary. The decision by the Court in Perkins was that the Walsh-Healey Act
was legally irrelevant to the bidders who brought the action, even though
they were injured in fact. 132 In comparison, tariff laws are legally irrele-
vant to buyers of imported goods, even though their businesses may be
injured.
For these buyers, standing could arise only from the legal concept that
each potential seller to the government has a right to equal access, that is,
access on the same terms as other potential sellers to the government.
Under this approach, those same sellers would have standing to object as
well to an erroneous statutory interpretation by the Secretary of Labor.
Moreover, if the decision in Perkins had been that the Secretary had misin-
terpreted the application of the statute, and that the statute was an internal
document only and not for the benefit of the bidders, it would clearly have
been advisory since no judgment could issue. This would be the case even
though the Secretary might feel morally bound to follow the Court's inter-
pretation. Perkins again clearly illustrates why the decision on standing
must include a preliminary analysis of the legal standard involved and
cannot be decided in the abstract. 3
3
In cases like Perkins the standing issue could not be resolved until the
Court determined who was the beneficiary of the applicable procurement
laws and the Walsh-Healey Act. When the privilege doctrine relating to
government contracting and government employment was subsequently
replaced by application of the due process and equal protection clauses, a
blacklisted bidder who had not been given a hearing was granted standing
to object to debarment,' 34 and a government employee whose dismissal
was due to his political affiliation was granted standing to object to the
spoils system.' 35 Under these clauses, the plaintiffs in Perkins would not
have standing to object to the Secretary of Labor's decision, not because
she made a mistake about the locality rule, but because she arbitrarily de-
nied Lukens Steel the right to bid in violation of its due process and equal
protection rights.
In two later cases, standing was improperly extended solely on the basis
of injury in fact. The first case is United States v. SCR,4P 13 6 in which a
claim was brought under the National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA), 137 although the NEPA does not grant standing to anyone. The
132. 310 U.S. at 113.
133. The recent constitutional crises in Canada produced a similar result. The Supreme
Court of Canada held that the Canadian Parliament could legally request the British Parlia-
ment for a change in the British North American Act, 1871 without the concurrence of the
Provinces, but that the Canadian Parliament was morally bound by convention to obtain
concurrence from the Provinces. Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada,
125 D.L.R.3d 1, 1-2 (1981). This holding led Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to compromise
his case with the Provinces even after a legal decision in his favor. If a similar issue, which
asked merely whether Parliament was morally bound, were raised in the future, any opinion
would clearly be advisory.
134. See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
135. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
136. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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plaintiffs, including various environmental groups, alleged that a railroad
shipping surcharge would discourage the use of recyclable materials. The
NEPA is simply a congressional directive to all governmental agencies to
consider certain environmental factors when making decisions. Thus the
NEPA is like the Administrative Procedure Act,' 38 the procurement regu-
lations,139 or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 40
Under the NEPA, only persons directly controlled or affected by agency
action have standing to raise NEPA-related issues. For example, in an
action between two parties concerning construction of a waste disposal
plant, a federal judge might consider whether the provisions of the NEPA
were incorporated into the contract between the parties. The judge, how-
ever, would never allow intervention in that suit by other persons who
might be affected if those standards were engrafted onto the contract. In-
terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ratemaking is similarly used to de-
termine the rights of shippers and carriers.' 41 For example, in an ICC
hearing regarding rate increase for transporting scrap metal, the ICC, like
the court, could consider NEPA standards if the shipper could show that a
rate increase would make transporting scrap uneconomical for him.
Adoption of the NEPA thus did not give standing to persons whose only
economic interest in ratemaking is the fallout from higher or lower
rates. 142
The problem in SCRAP is that the Court considered the wrong statute
when it applied the Data Processing formula. 143 The complaining party's
interests would have to have been within the zone protected by the ICC
statute, not the NEPA. Standing to object to an ICC determination must
be based upon an analysis of who is regulated by the ICC once one is
given rights by the organic ICC Act. 144 An agency's failure to consider the
NEPA, just as its failure to consider the APA, would not result in standing
unless the party's claim arose from the organic statute under which the
particular agency was operating. Thus if a regulation by a government
138. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
139. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2202, 2301-2314 (1976).
140. The NEPA is a general directive relating to the environment, just as the APA is a
general procedural directive for administrative agencies and the equal protection clause is a
generalized concept applicable to government operations. None of these directives decides
standing issues in themselves on a claim of violation by the agency involved. The persons
who have standing are those aggrieved by the particular agencies acting under their particu-
lar authority.
141. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907); see also Inter-
state Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 55, repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b), (c), 92 Stat.
1466, 1470 (1978).
142.- By contrast, when Congress wished to grant standing to workers or communities in
decisions concerning termination of services, standing was explicitly granted by statute.
Standing was granted explicitly because such standing is the exception rather than the rule.
See Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 18-20, repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b),
(c), 92 Stat. 1466-70 (1978); see also ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373
(1942); Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1925).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
144. The organic act here is the general statute setting up and defining the power of the
ICC. See generally Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10125 (1976).
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agency directly affects the interests of a party specifically protected by the
organic statute under which the agency operates, and if that regulation
violates the APA, the NEPA, or the equal protection clause, then that
party would have standing to attack the regulation. This interpretation of
the NEPA would have avoided the seemingly absurd pleading require-
ment in Sierra Club v. Morton .14  Using this interpretation, the Sierra
Club could have pleaded that it was the beneficiary of the statute, which
mandates mixed uses of national forests, and that the proposed use would
have affected its rights as established by that statute. 146 The artificial in-
jury claimed in the actual case could then have been replaced by the rea-
sonable claim that the Sierra Club and others similarly situated were the
intended beneficiaries of the statute that regulates the management of the
national forests. Thus legal analysis of the statute, rather than a particular
injury, would have determined whether standing should have been granted
to the group attacking the government action in the name of NEPA.
The other major case that improperly extended standing on the basis of
injury in fact is Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc. 147 In this case the Court granted standing 148 so that it could review
the political wisdom of a statute whose operation did not legally affect the
complaining party in a manner distinct from that in which it affected every
other United States citizen. The statute was the Price-Anderson Act, 149
which limited liability for nuclear plant accidents. The plaintiffs' standing
derived entirely from an injury-in-fact, "but-for" analysis. As contiguous
landowners the plaintiffs feared the prospect of uncompensated injury to
their land by a privately built nuclear plant. If the nuclear plant was a
nuisance or if it reduced the value of their land or caused environmental
damage, these landowners could have objected to the granting of building
permits or to the waiver of zoning ordinances in their area. Their objec-
tion, however, was to a general governmental subsidy of the nuclear power
industry through the Price-Anderson Act. 150 The Court construed the
complaint as an action against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) for passing a statute limiting liability.151
An analysis of the subsidy argument indicates that by using this argu-
145. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Sierra Club the Court required that persons attacking the
proposal indicate in their pleading that they had a personal stake in the outcome because
they used the park. Standing should have been resolved on a determination of whether the
plaintiffs were among the legal beneficiaries of the acts controlling the national forests and
parks.
146. 16 U.S.C. §§ 475, 495, 497, 501, 532, 577a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
147. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
148. Id. at 81.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
150. Id § 2210(c).
151. 438 U.S. at 69 n. 13. To the extent that Congress limits liability, it may for national
purposes be seen as a taking. Hence, an attack on the limitation would not arise under the
due process clause, but under the just compensation clause. This distinction was clearly
made in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 687-88 (1981), in which the Court pointed
out that the interest of the claimants is in their recovery and not in the operation of foreign
policy. The Court's reference to just compensation rather than due process is, therefore,
appropriate.
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ment, anyone with land contiguous to a subsidized activity could attack
the subsidy on the basis that "but for" the subsidy, either the activity
would not exist, or it could not physically be increased. Under a parity of
reasoning, a landowner near a newly built or a proposed steel mill could
attack a law restricting the importation of steel. Similarly, developers
could complain that their ability to buy agricultural land was inhibited by
agricultural price supports artificially keeping up the price of land.
As to three of the injuries alleged in Duke Power, the release of small
quantities of radiation, a sharp increase in the temperature of two lakes,
and a fear that the closeness of the nuclear plant would have adverse ge-
netic effects, these injuries would have occurred had any nuclear power
plant been built. Thus the claims should more properly have been referred
to a zoning board. Moreover, similar claims arise any time the govern-
ment subsidizes an activity that may impact contiguous landowners. Yet
on the basis of these "but-for," injury-in-fact arguments, the Court granted
standing to plaintiffs to attack a political decision to subsidize nuclear
power even though the injury, to the extent any injury occurred, arose
from the existence of nuclear power and not from the subsidy itself.
Had the government decided to build a nuclear plant itself rather than
to subsidize private builders, the issue would have been whether doing so
would constitute reverse condemnation. Litigation on that issue is compa-
rable to suits attacking any governmental subsidy that cannot be enjoined
as a private nuisance, but which results in substantial externalities. In such
cases the claim is not that the activity or the law authorizing the activity is
unconstitutional, but that the activity is in fact a taking and subject to just
compensation. 52
If the nature of the subsidy (the limitation on liability) is considered, the
conclusion is the same. Standing should not be granted to a taxpayer to
attack a nuclear power subsidy. As Justice Harlan pointed out in Flast v.
Cohen, a taxpayer has no more interest in federal monies than anyone else,
and federal expenditures are left to the discretion of Congress. 53 On the
other hand, standards of liability and limitations on damages impact indi-
viduals differently. The Price-Anderson Act, for example, limits liability
in an area of law generally conceived as belonging to the states: private
tort law. The issue in Duke Power, then, was federalism: Whether under
the supremacy clause the federal government may alter legal rights be-
tween private parties, or whether this alteration of legal rights is a matter
reserved to the states. Clearly, the federal government can subsidize com-
panies or when subsidizing is insufficient, it can enter the business directly.
In these situations the issue is to what extent sovereign immunity can be
152. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). Reference here is to the
Court's statement that to the extent the petitioner believed it had suffered an unconstitu-
tional taking by the suspension of claims, no jurisdictional obstacle existed to an appropriate
action in the United States Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. Id at 689. Thus the
Court recognized that the parties were to be compensated if the exercise of foreign police
prerogatives involved personal losses.
153. 392 U.S. at 118-20.
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limited either by the Federal Tort Claims Act' 54 or the taking clause of the
fifth amendment. 55 The issue may be brought to a head by an exercise of
the state's police power requiring greater security than that required by the
federal act. That issue is appropriate for adjudication. The issue can also
properly arise in a negligence or strict liability action for damages actually
incurred when the defense in the action derives from the limitation on
liability. Again, the Court would be asked to determine whether under the
commerce clause or the supremacy clause federal law can modify state
law. In these examples, contiguous landowners would be appropriate
plaintiffs only in the last case, and in that situation, they would be in the
same position as any other injured person. In effect, the Court's decision
in Duke Power is an advisory opinion on the right of states to legislate in
this area and on the extent to which parties actually injured can have their
damages reduced. According to the Court, the issue was whether the pos-
sible damage to contiguous landowners was sufficient to impede an author-
ized government program. The issue in Duke Power, however, was never
that issue. Rather, the issue was whether the government can subsidize an
industry by changing state tort laws. The result of Duke Power should not
have been the prevention of plant construction as desired by the plaintiffs,
but a requirement that the government indemnify the plaintiffs against ex-
cessive losses.' 56
Thus in Duke Power the Court validated an act without having before it
the proper parties or interests. By relying entirely on one side of the equa-
tion, the injury to property, rather than requiring a nexus between the in-
jury and the source of power, the Court left the law of standing without a
rationale. As a result, the Court must now create rules of standing for
cases in which no particular injury to discrete property exists. In Duke
Power those rules were called prudential, 15 7 and no guidelines were pro-
vided for their use. In our hierarchial legal system, the Court of last resort
should provide these guidelines.
In the majority opinion in Duke Power Justice Burger acknowledged
that the Court does not have a consistent theory of standing, but that it
imposes standing limitations on the basis of "prudential concerns" about
the proper and properly limited role of courts in a democratic society.
What the Chief Justice failed to recognize, however, is that granting un-
limited standing to property interests to question governmental policy in-
terferes with the functioning of the other branches of government as much
as does granting standing to undifferentiated interests. Moreover, failure
154. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 10.
156. See Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 234 U.S. 219 (1917); New York Central
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). The imposition of strict liability in exchange for a
limitation on damages would not be a violation of the taking clause if the limitation were
reasonable, for example, as with the workers' compensation laws. This fact does not, how-
ever, resolve the federalism issue.
157. 438 U.S. at 80.
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to apply properly the rules of standing violates article III, section 2
whether standing is denied or granted.
In United States v. Richardson '5 8 and Warth v. Seldin 159 the Court ex-
tolled the prudential considerations that resulted in denial of standing to
consumers and citizens. In contrast, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 160 and Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia'6' the Court granted standing to those very interests. In both
Virginia Pharmacy and Richmond Newspapers, as in Warth and Richard-
son, there was a clear nexus between the violation claimed and the interest
alleged. In each case, however, the interests of each individual were undif-
ferentiated from that of the others. In Virginia Pharmacy a group of con-
sumers was granted the right to contest a restriction on the advertising of
products sold by prescription. 162 The group had sought the information in
order to exercise intelligently their right to buy products in the market
place. In Warth a similar group was denied standing to contest a zoning
ordinance that prevented developers of land from building high density,
low-cost housing within a city.' 63 In the former case, the argument for
restriction was that advertising would be unprofessional and unreliable
and that the restriction limited the evils that would result from cut-throat
competition. In the latter case, the argument for the prohibition against
high density housing was that it protected existing residents from the
problems of servicing large populations and preserved property values.
In both cases the legislative entity responded to an entrenched group at
the expense of possible consumers. The plaintiffs in Virginia Pharmacy
had less of a claim than the plaintiffs in Warth, since the Virginia Phar-
macy plaintiffs had access to the legislative process. The plaintiffs in
Warth had no access to the political process because they were nonresi-
dents. Yet in the former case, the Court had no difficulty in assuming that
without the restriction the market would supply the advertising, whereas in
the latter case, the Court demanded proof that the market would supply
the housing. 164 If, however, proof that the market would supply low den-
sity housing could have been provided, then no zoning was necessary. Yet,
the very existence of the zoning law was based upon the legislative deter-
mination that without the restriction high density housing would be built.
These two decisions indicate either that the Supreme Court is unable to
reason by analogy, or that by some undefined process it picks and chooses
which legislative efforts may be challenged in court. A free market in
drugs is preferred to a free market in housing either because the consumers
of drugs are better organized or because the evils of a drug cartel are better
158. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
159. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
160. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
161. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
162. 425 U.S. at 757.
163. 422 U.S. at 508.
164. 422 U.S. at 503 n.14.
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understood than the market effects of housing restrictions. In a legal sys-
tem, such distinctions can hardly be credited.
In Richardson a citizen challenged Congress for failure to comply with
article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution, which provides: "[A] regu-
lar statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public
money shall be published from time to time.' 165 The purpose of this pro-
vision is to supply the public with the information necessary for an intelli-
gent exercise of its political rights. The impact of this provision, like the
first amendment right to know, is certainly on a higher level than the right
of consumers to know where to buy prescription drugs. Yet, the Court
failed to recognize either the purpose of the constitutional provision or the
right of the citizen to know.
By contrast, in Richmond Newspapers the Court first performed an his-
torical exegesis to prove that trials at common law were public. Based
upon this proof, the Court then granted standing to the public to raise the
issue of whether trials can be closed. The Court neither referred to the
rules of standing nor explained why the plaintiffs in Richardson did not
have a similar right to contest the closing of accounts by Congress. The
opinion shows a general consensus that the first amendment is implicated
by the public trial provision of the fifth amendment. In addition, although
standing was not specifically addressed, the Court was eminently aware
that the public has standing to demand access to a trial. For example,
Justice Brennan writes in his concurring opinion:
A conceptually separate, yet related, question is whether the media
should enjoy greater access rights than the general public. See, e.g.,
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-835 (1974). But no such contention is at
stake here. Since the media's right of access is at least equal to that of
the general public, see ibid., this case is resolved by a decision that the
state statute unconstitutionally restricts public access to trials. As a
practical matter, however, the institutional press is the likely, and
fitting, chief beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the
"agent" of interested citizens, and funnels information about trials to
a large number of individuals. 166
Because any citizen has standing to seek review of a trial closure, the
logical implication is that any citizen has standing to seek review of the
closure of other governmental acts required by law to be public. The pub-
lic's right to demand review of a trial closure is thus no different from the
public's right to demand an accounting for governmental expenditures
when by law that accounting is required to be public. The fact that the
public has standing, however, does not preclude closure under appropriate
circumstances. That the public has standing means merely that closure
must be justified in terms of other values. For example, in the trial situa-
tion closure may be justified to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial;
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 7.
166. 448 U.S. at 586.
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in the accounting situation, closure may be required for national security.
In light of the development of parliamentary government, however, no one
can seriously contend that the public has less interest in where its money
goes than in what happens in a criminal trial. Yet, amidst all the paeans to
the public's right-to-know in Richmond Newspapers, not one Justice made
reference to the Court's refusal to protect that right in Richardson or drew
any analogy between the right of access to trial information and the right
of access to other information required by law to be public. After Rich-
mond Newspapers and Virginia Pharmacy, the Court's failure to recognize
that rights held jointly and severally by the public may be a basis for
standing is remarkable.
Applying the analysis suggested in this Article to the above public law
cases indicates that the standing should have been granted in Warth and
Richardson, as it was in Virginia Pharmacy and Richmond Newspapers. In
Richardson and Richmond Newspapers the standard derived from two sep-
arate constitutional provisions, both of which were arguably for the pur-
pose of insuring public disclosure. In both cases the government's actions
cut off the public's right to know, and public's request was that the courts
consider a different interpretation of the particular constitutional provi-
sion. Similarly, in Virginia Pharmacy and Warth the governmental entity
exercised its police power to protect the public from an alleged evil. In
these cases the government limited the ability of consumers to obtain
goods in the market place. In both cases the function of the courts was
simply to review whether the police power was legitimately exercised.
Use of the suggested analysis disposes of prudential limitations and
magic talismans describing particular injuries. This analysis recognizes
that standing decisions can be made only within a framework of legal
rights and duties. These rights and duties exist between both the state and
the public at large, and between private parties. Accordingly, such rights
and duties are functions of public as well as private law. One need only
understand the legal process and the necessity for restricting courts to cases
and controversies based upon the parties claims of right to apply this anal-
ysis effectively.
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